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RETHINKING MEDICAID IN THE NEW NORMAL 
SARA ROSENBAUM* AND BENJAMIN D. SOMMERS** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a half century, Medicaid has been a shock absorber for a 
system characterized by its strong commitment to market-based solutions to 
health care financing.  To understand Medicaid simply as health insurance 
for the poor is to miss the point.  Unmatched in its ability to compensate for 
the limitations inherent in the design of private health insurance, Medicaid 
extends far beyond its role as a health insurance subsidy for certain groups 
of poor people.1  Devoid of the exclusionary qualities that traditionally have 
characterized the private insurance market,2 as well as Medicare’s lengthy 
statutory waiting period in the case of persons with disabilities,3 Medicaid is 
explicitly designed to finance health care for the sick.4  This singular ability 
 
* Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor of Health Law and Policy, The George Washington 
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** Assistant Professor of Health Policy and Economics, Harvard School of Public Health. 
 1. MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
MEDICAID AND CHIP 9-10 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter MACPAC].  In FY 2010, Medicaid 
provided either primary or secondary coverage for 68 million people.  Id. at 10, Box 1-1.  Its 
coverage reached 33 million children, 11 million children and adults with disabilities, 17 
million non-disabled adults (pregnant women and caretakers of minor children), and 6 million 
elderly persons.  Id. 
 2. For perhaps the finest insight into the fundamentally discriminatory nature of a private 
health insurance market built on concepts of actuarial risk see Deborah Stone, The Struggle 
for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y. & L. 287, 290 (1993).  The seminal 
contribution of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is the virtual elimination of 
insurers’ discretion to exclude or discriminate against access to coverage based on health 
status. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1201, 124 Stat. 
119, 154 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg) (amending Public Health Services Act 
(“PHSA”) § 2704). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 426(b) (2006).  For an explanation of the two-year waiting period, which 
affects some 1.8 million persons with disabilities see MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., END THE TWO-YEAR 
WAIT FOR MEDICARE, available at http://www.medicarerights.org/pdf/two_year_waiting_pe 
riod_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Sep. 28, 2011). 
 4. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2006) (describing the benefits which Medicaid 
is required to supply).  Medicaid eligibility is conditioned strictly on whether an individual falls 
within one of the statute’s recognized eligibility categories and meets the program’s financial 
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to aid people in the poorest health as a result of its unique benefit design 
structure allows Medicaid to extend into areas of health care that lie well 
beyond the limits of private insurance.5 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act6 (hereinafter referred to 
as the Affordable Care Act, (“ACA”)) tackles the problem of discriminatory 
exclusion from insurance but does not address Medicaid’s other roles.  
Indeed, even where the threshold matter of insurance access is concerned, 
the ACA builds on rather than replaces Medicaid, expanding its reach while 
limiting eligibility for insurance affordability subsidies secured through state 
health insurance Exchanges to persons ineligible for Medicaid or another 
form of “creditable coverage.”7 
This decision to preserve Medicaid reflects many considerations.  For the 
country’s poorest children and adults who are entitled to its benefits, 
Medicaid finances a range of health care that goes well beyond the limits of 
private health insurance, covering clinical interventions for children with 
developmental disabilities,8 long term institutional services furnished in 
nursing homes or intermediate care facilities,9 and community-based 
services of personal attendants and home care aides whose work makes it 
 
and other requirements.  Id. § 1396a(a)(10).  No health status test is used other than to make 
people eligible based on health status (e.g., pregnancy, disability).  Id. § 1396a(a).  Eligibility 
can be retroactive to the date of application in order to cover previously incurred health care 
costs.  Id. § 1396a(a)(34). Many eligibility categories are linked to health care need at the 
time of enrollment (e.g., pregnancy, disability, age).  Id. § 1396a(a)(10). 
 5. See MACPAC, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
 6. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).  The two preceding laws will be hereinafter cited together 
as “ACA.” 
 7. ACA § 1413 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18083). 
 8. See MACPAC, supra note 1, at 10.  The contrast between Medicaid and commercial 
insurance can be best seen in the striking facts of Mondry v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 557 
F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 200 (2009).  Mondry, which arose under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), involved the denial of speech therapy 
for a child covered under the employer’s health benefit plan and born with developmental 
disabilities.  Despite the clinical appropriateness of the treatment, the plan administrator 
denied coverage on the ground that in this child’s case, treatment was merely “educational.”  
Id. at 783-84, 799.  Ultimately the child was able to successfully receive these services 
through BadgerCare, Wisconsin’s name for Medicaid.  See id. at 786.  Mondry offers a 
remarkably clear example of the subtle ways in which private insurers discriminate against 
persons with disabilities while Medicaid does not.  For a broader discussion of insurance 
design practices that discriminate against persons with disabilities.  See Sara Rosenbaum et 
al., Crossing the Rubicon, the Impact of the Affordable Care Act on the Content of Coverage 
for Persons with Disabilities, 25 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527, 532-39 (2011) 
[hereinafter Rosenbaum et al., Crossing]. 
 9. See MACPAC, supra note 1, at 156-57. 
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possible for children and adults with disabilities to grow, live, and work in 
integrated community settings.10  Medicaid compensates for Medicare’s 
limitations for the poorest beneficiaries, paying program premiums and 
cost-sharing and covering Medicare-excluded services ranging from 
eyeglasses and hearing aids to long-term care.11  Furthermore, because it 
not only insures the poor but also pays special enhanced rates12 to certain 
health care safety net providers,13 Medicaid financially enables health care 
 
 10. Id. at 12; see, e.g., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 7720-04, 
MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES PROGRAMS: DATA UPDATE 1-2 (Feb. 2011) 
[hereinafter MEDICAID HOME], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7720-04.pdf 
(reporting on the growth of home and community based services funding under Medicaid and 
opportunities for further growth under the ACA).  So important is Medicaid to community-
based care for persons with disabilities that on numerous occasions Congress has amended 
Medicaid to expand its availability to both children and adults with disabilities.  See, e.g., 
Ticket To Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 2, 
113 Stat. 1860, 1863 (1999) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305) (allowing states to extend 
Medicaid to adults with disabilities whose ability to work threatens their continued eligibility for 
Social Security disability benefits and thus both Medicare and Medicaid); see also The Family 
Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6062, 120 Stat. 4, 96 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1305) (allowing states to provide Medicaid to moderate income families whose children 
otherwise would not qualify for Medicaid under a state plan but whose disabilities have 
exhausted the limits of private health insurance coverage). 
 11. See MACPAC, supra note 1, at 26, 33, Table 2-1.  For a discussion of dual eligibles, 
the common name for persons entitled to both Medicare and Medicaid see id. at 27-45. 
 12. MACPAC, supra note 1, at 10. Community health centers are paid on the basis of a 
prospective payment system tied to patient costs.  PETER SHIN, LEIGHTON KU, EMILY JONES, BRAD 
FINNEGAN & SARA ROSENBAUM, FINANCING COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS AS PATIENT- AND 
COMMUNITY-CENTERED MEDICAL HOMES 17-22 (2009) [hereinafter FINANCING COMMUNITY 
HEALTH CENTERS], available at http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/departments/healthpolicy/dhp_ 
publications/pub_uploads/dhpPublication_A186E838-5056-9D20-3D9EA92EB75DAC 
24.pdf.  Public hospitals frequently receive “disproportionate share” payments under Medicaid 
because of the high volume of services furnished to low-income patients.  In addition, as 
public health care institutions, public hospitals may qualify for higher Medicaid payments than 
rates paid to private hospitals under special Medicaid “upper payment limit” rules.  OBAID 
ZAMAN ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF PUB. HOSP. & HEALTH SYS., AMERICA’S PUBLIC HOSPITALS & HEALTH 
SYSTEMS, 2009 at 16-19 (2010) [hereinafter NAPH], available at http://www.naph.org/Main-
Menu-Category/Publications/Safety-Net-Financing/2009-Public-Hospital-Financial-Character 
istics-.aspx?FT=.pdf. 
 13. MACPAC, supra note 1, at 2, 10, 132.  The health care safety net accounts for a 
disproportionate percentage of all primary health care.  Id. at 10.  Medicaid a substantial 
provider to health care financing for community health centers.  SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., KAISER 
COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 8098, COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS: 
OPPORTUNITIES & CHALLENGES OF HEALTH REFORM 4 fig. 5 (2010) [hereinafter ROSENBAUM ET 
AL., OPPORTUNITIES], available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/8098.pdf (Medicaid 
accounted for more than 37% of all health center revenues in 2008); see also NAPH, supra 
note 12, at 36, app. C Table 6 (showing Medicaid’s dominant role as a payer source). 
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access in impoverished and medically underserved communities and 
markets in which unsubsidized practices are an impossibility.14 
Beginning January 1, 2014,15 the ACA rectifies Medicaid’s most basic 
failing by eliminating the restrictions that historically have excluded from 
coverage low-income nonelderly adults other than those who can claim an 
attachment to the program on the basis of disability, pregnancy, or status as 
caretaker relatives of minor children eligible for cash welfare benefits.16  At 
the same time, the ACA builds a companion system of subsidized insurance 
for people without another form of creditable coverage (including 
Medicaid).17  From the perspective of low and moderate-income people 
therefore, the Exchange system picks up where Medicaid leaves off.  Thus, 
because the Act tackles the problem of affordable coverage for lower 
income people through two distinct pathways, the law also divides the 
population into two groups: those who meet Medicaid’s financial eligibility 
requirements; and those who qualify for Exchange subsidies.  In so doing, 
the Act eliminates the historic “cliff” from which people no longer eligible for 
Medicaid previously would have fallen.  But this bifurcated approach—built 
in part to preserve the status quo and in part to shield the federal 
government from the full cost of insuring low-income people18—comes with 
its own set of challenges. 
 
 14. MACPAC, supra note 1, at 131-32.  By contrast, private insurance is a poor payer.  
One study that has compared Medicaid revenues to those received by community health 
centers from commercial payers has found that over an eight year period, cumulative losses 
experienced from serving patients with private insurance approached $4 billion, a cost that 
shifted onto health centers’ federal grants.  PETER SHIN, BRAD FINNEGAN, JESSICA SHARAC & SARA 
ROSENBAUM, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 7738, HEALTH CENTERS: AN 
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 8 fig. 13 (2008) 
[hereinafter HEALTH CENTERS], available at http://www.kff.org/ uninsured/upload/7738.pdf. 
 15. ACA § 1101 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001).  States may implement 
Medicaid coverage earlier at their option.  Id. § 2001(a)(4)(B). 
 16. For an explanation of Medicaid’s traditional eligibility rules see KAISER COMM’N ON 
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 7-14 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/upload/7334-04.pdf. 
 17. ACA § 1331 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18051). 
 18. A major point of discussion in designing the new law was whether to cover all low 
income persons through health insurance exchanges, with state Medicaid programs 
responsible for coverage of supplemental Medicaid services only.  This approach was rejected 
because of the increase cost associated with the federal government’s entire assumption of the 
cost of coverage, in contrast to Medicaid, in which the cost of coverage is borne by both the 
federal and state governments.  Discussion with Mark Hayes, former Staff Dir., Senate Finance 
Comm., Subcomm. on Health, and David Schwartz,  Majority Staff, Senate Finance Comm., 
Subcomm. on Health (May 6, 2011).  Mr. Hayes, Mr. Schwartz, and Professor Rosenbaum 
held many discussions on this issue throughout the creation of the ACA during 2009.  Mr. 
Hayes reported that the initial price tag given the Committee staff for creating a unified 
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Of course, even if Congress had taken a more unified approach to 
insuring lower income people, Medicaid’s continuation would have been 
essential because of the multiple roles it plays.  These roles persist, despite 
the ACA’s own coverage improvements.  The Act establishes new preventive 
coverage standards in the individual and employer-sponsored health plan 
markets,19 prohibits the use of annual and lifetime coverage caps,20 extends 
mental health and substance use disorder parity protections into the new 
Exchange market,21 and brings more standardization and potentially greater 
scope of coverage in the individual and small group markets through the 
application of “essential health benefit” criteria.22  But these coverage 
improvements fall well short of Medicaid’s scope of health care financing.  
With the exception of the law’s CLASS Act provisions,23 whose 
 
coverage system for all low income non-elderly Americans approached $100 billion over ten 
years over and above what it would cost to expand Medicaid to cover all low income persons. 
 19. ACA § 1001 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §300gg-13) (adding PHSA § 2713).  
Grandfathered plans are exempt. See ACA § 1251 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18011).  
These services consist of evidence-based items or services that have an effective rating of “A” 
or “B” from the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, immunizations recommended by the 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, and additional preventive services recommended for children, infants, adolescents 
and women by the Health Resources and Services Administration of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services.  See Group Health Plan and Health Insurance 
Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621-26 (Aug. 3, 2011) (defining preventive services 
generally and additional preventive services for women, respectively); Interim Final Rules for 
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726-60 (July 19, 
2010); Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to 
Status as Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 
Fed. Reg. 34,538-70 (June 17, 2010) (explaining grandfathering rules). 
 20. ACA § 1001 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11) (adding PHSA § 2711).  The 
annual lifetime limit is phased in beginning with plan years after the date of passage. As of 
Summer 2011, Health & Human Services (“HHS”) had granted numerous waivers of the 
annual coverage limit restrictions.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-725R, 
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: WAIVERS OF RESTRICTIONS ON ANNUAL LIMITS ON HEALTH BENEFITS 1-2 
(2011), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/docu 
ments/GAOReport_06.14.11.pdf (finding that HHS had waived 95% of 1,415 requests for 
waivers of the limit restrictions received to date). 
 21. ACA § 1311(j) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031).  Mental health parity 
regulations implementing legislation strengthening previous parity requirements were issued in 
2009.  45 C.F.R. § 146.136 (2010). 
 22. ACA § 1302 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022).  As of January 1, 2014, all 
health plans sold in the individual and small group markets will be required to cover certain 
“essential health benefits.”  Id. 
 23. ACA § 8002 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ll).  The CLASS Act would have 
established the CLASS program, a system of private long-term care coverage that could have 
been purchased during work years.  Id.  Medicaid would have continued to supplement the 
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implementation has been halted (at least for the foreseeable future) as a 
result of aspects of its statutory design that create financial sustainability 
challenges, 24 the Act does not fund long-term care.  Similarly, nothing in 
the Act bars classic coverage exclusions such as educational exclusions 
aimed at denying otherwise covered treatments for children and adults with 
developmental disabilities;25 indeed, the law contains a sweeping provision 
barring the Secretary of HHS from promulgating “regulations that 
prohibit . . . a group health plan or health insurance issuer from carrying 
out utilization management techniques that are commonly used as of the 
date of enactment of this Act.”26  This limitation on Secretarial power had 
not yet been interpreted as of the Summer of 2011.  But the assumption is 
that in view of the price of health insurance and therefore, the cost of 
subsidies, essential health benefit regulations (which are expected in winter 
2012)27 will give insurers broad leeway to impose coverage limitations 
(subject to mental health parity rules where applicable) that utilize strict 
standards of medical necessity and apply coverage and medical 
management guidelines that impede the full reach of coverage in ways that 
Medicaid does not in view of its historic mission.28 
Nor does the Act provide a full shield against high cost-sharing at the 
point of service.  The law makes cost-sharing assistance available to lower 
income people who purchase “qualified health plans” sold through state 
health insurance Exchanges.29  At the same time however, qualified health 
plan offerings are required by law to use a cost-sharing framework that 
essentially locks in considerable financial exposure, even among those who 
are not well off.  Cost-sharing subsidies are tied to “silver plans” whose 
 
more limited CLASS benefits, which had, not yet been defined by the Administration.  See 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NO. 8069, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND THE CLASS ACT 1, 4 (Apr. 2010) 
[hereinafter REFORM AND CLASS ACT], available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/ 
8069.pdf. 
 24. Robert Pear, Health Law to be Revised by Ending a Program., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2011, at A10. Gardiner Harris & Robert Pear, Still No Relief in Sight for Long Term Care 
Needs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 2011, at D1.  
 25. See Mondry, 557 F.3d at 790. 
 26. ACA § 1562(d)(1) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18120).  Subsidies will increase the 
actuarial value of the silver plan to 94% for persons with incomes below 150% of the federal 
poverty level and 87% for persons with incomes between 150% and 200% of the federal 
poverty level. ACA § 1331(a)(2) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18051).  For a discussion of 
how insurance limits discriminate against people with disabilities, see Rosenbaum et al., 
Crossing, supra note 8, 531. 
 27. See REFORM AND CLASS ACT, supra note 23, at 4. 
 28. See discussion of children with developmental disabilities supra, note 8; Mondry, 557 
F.3d at 789 n. 3. 
 29. ACA § 1402(c) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18071). 
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actuarial rating equals only 70% of full actuarial value.30  Although the law’s 
cost-sharing subsidies reduce this financial exposure, they by no means 
eliminate it, and subsidies undergo a steep phase-out, ending entirely at 
four times the federal poverty level.31  This level of financial support is well 
below that offered by Medicaid, which requires that cost-sharing be nominal 
and bars the use of cost-sharing entirely for certain populations.32 
In terms of support for the health care safety net, the Act makes 
fundamental contributions by insuring millions of low-income people.  At the 
same time however, these contributions pale next to Medicaid’s power as an 
ongoing engine of health care services in medically underserved 
communities.  Medicaid remains central to the safety net not only because it 
insures the poor, but also because of its special payment rates that shield 
safety net providers from losses to which they otherwise would be exposed 
because of low insurer payments in relation to the cost of caring for 
clinically complex patients.33  To be sure, the Act makes a historic 
investment in the expansion of community health centers.34  But these 
expansion funds are time-limited, ending in 2015,35 after which the 
assumption is that public and private health insurance (along with 
discretionary grant subsidies to help offset costs associated with those who 
remain uninsured)36 will pick up ongoing operational costs.  Historically 
however, health centers and other safety net providers have experienced 
significant losses under private health insurance as a result of low payment 
rates, high patient cost sharing, and coverage disallowances.37  Although 
the Act requires qualified health plans sold in Exchanges to pay community 
health centers at their enhanced Medicaid payment rates,38 early signals are 
that the federal government is approaching enforcement with skepticism, 
 
 30. ACA § 1302(d)(1)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022). 
 31. ACA § 5601 (amending PHSA § 254b(r)). The actual funding amount allocated to 
this expansion is found in ACA §§ 18121, 1201, 1204, 1303. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a)(1)(3) (2006). 
 33. HEALTH CENTERS, supra note 14, at 7. 
 34. MEDICAID HOME, supra note 10, at 15. 
 35. ACA § 5601 (amending PHSA § 330(r)). 
 36. HEALTH CENTERS, supra note 14, at 6; see also FINANCING COMMUNITY HEALTH 
CENTERS, supra note 12, at 8.  Federally funded community health centers receive annual 
operating funding through the Congressional appropriations process.  Discretionary grant 
funds for the uninsured represent approximately 21% of health centers’ operating revenue.  
KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 7877, COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS fig. 4 
(Mar. 2009), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7877.pdf. 
 37. HEALTH CENTERS, supra note 14, at 8-10, fig. 13. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 18022, added by ACA §1302(g). 
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leaving the safety net vulnerable to cost-shifting by private health insurers 
against grant funds intended for treatment of the uninsured.39 
 
 39. Proposed rules implementing state health insurance exchanges illuminate the 
quandary that federal agencies can find themselves in when they attempt to implement a clear 
congressional directive that, in an agency’s view, may raise unintended consequences.  Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 
76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,899-41,900 (July 15, 2011) [hereinafter Establishment of 
Exchanges].   
  HHS’ discussion of the difficulties associated with implementing the FQHC payment 
system is fascinating both for its frankness and for the extent to which, in this instance, the 
federal government may be willing to allow private health insurers to cost-shift onto federal 
grants intended to keep the health care safety net afloat for the remaining uninsured 
(approximately 24 million people).  The enactment of special payment rates in Medicaid and 
Medicare was intended to stop cost-shifting by public insurers against appropriated programs 
as well as based on evidence of the overall cost effectiveness of community health centers.  
LEIGHTON KU ET AL., GEIGER GIBSON /RCHN COMTY. HEALTH FOUND. RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE, 
POLICY RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 16, USING PRIMARY CARE TO BEND THE COST CURVE: THE POTENTIAL 
IMPACT OF HEALTH CENTER EXPANSION IN SENATE REFORMS 5 (Oct. 14, 2009). 
  Apparently where private insurers are concerned however, this cost shift may be 
acceptable to HHS if the consequences are more limited access to health centers as network 
members.   
[T]wo provisions of the Affordable Care Act regarding payment of essential community 
providers and payment of Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) may conflict. 
Section 1311(c)(2) of the Affordable Care Act states that nothing shall be construed to 
require a QHP to contract with an essential community provider if such provider 
refuses to accept the generally applicable payment rates of the plan.  This requirement 
may conflict with section 1302(g) of the Affordable Care Act, which requires that a 
QHP issuer reimburse FQHCs at each facility’s Medicaid prospective payment system 
(PPS) rate. . . .  One approach to reconciling these provisions would be to require 
QHP issuers to pay at least the Medicaid PPS rate to each FQHC that participates in 
the issuer’s QHP network. . . .  However, if FQHC Medicaid PPS rates are greater than 
comparable amounts paid to other providers, and if many of the enrollees in a QHP 
receive care at FQHCs, the costs of these QHPs may be greater than the costs of 
QHPs that do not have many enrollees who are seen at the centers.  Also, if Medicaid 
prospective payment rates exceed QHPs’ generally applicable payment rates, requiring 
QHP issuers to pay the full FQHC Medicaid PPS rate could lead insurers to minimally 
contract with FQHCs. . . .  Another potential approach to reconciling these two 
payment provisions would be to permit issuers to negotiate mutually agreed-upon 
payment rates with FQHCs, as long as they are at least equal to the issuer’s generally 
applicable payment rates.  Such an interpretation may furnish FQHCs with a degree of 
negotiating leverage with issuers to obtain payment rates higher than the issuer’s 
generally applicable payment rates but not tie issuers to the full Medicaid PPS rate for 
in-network FQHCs.  This approach would decrease the incentive to drive patients away 
from providers that may be best suited to their needs, while providing FQHCs with 
leverage to be able to negotiate payments that will allow them to continue providing 
the comprehensive services that are particularly valuable to the individuals they serve.  
However, this approach may result in FQHCs receiving less than their Medicaid PPS 
rates for in-network participation.  We invite comment.  
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For all of these reasons, the preservation of Medicaid for the poor and 
the medically vulnerable is vital.  At the same time, this decision to use 
Medicaid as a primary source of insurance rather than as a supplemental 
payer to expand and complement on basic coverage for certain populations 
and health care systems was hardly without controversy.  The source of this 
controversy is both political and operational.  On the political front, state 
opposition to Medicaid expansion has been widespread and has spilled 
over into the general legal attacks on the law.40  This state opposition has 
persisted despite the availability of heavily enhanced federal contributions to 
the cost of covering the expansion population,41 in part because of the 
general state of high state stress over Medicaid, and in part because new 
outreach and enrollment requirements,42 discussed infra, are also expected 
to result in the enrollment of potentially millions of children and adults who 
are entitled to coverage under current law but remain unenrolled.43  No 
enhanced contributions are available for this population of “traditionally 
eligible” beneficiaries however. 
The second cause of controversy is Medicaid’s inability to assure 
appropriate access to care for the poor.  Medicaid historically suffered 
under serious limitations owing to the widespread physician non-
 
Establishment of Exchanges, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,899-41,900.  In fact, there is no evidence 
that health plans have avoided health centers as primary care network members, particularly 
in medically underserved communities where access to primary care is very limited to begin 
with. 
 40. See Florida v. U.S. Dep. of Health % Human Serv., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting claims of unconstitutional commandeering of state Medicaid programs); see 
generally Benjamin Sommers & Arnold Epstein, Why States are So Miffed About Medicaid, 
365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 100 (2011) (discussing Medicaid’s effects on state budgets and 
examining the political challenges which expanding Medicaid presents). 
 41. ACA § 2001(a)(3) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)).  Normal federal 
contributions to the state cost of medical assistance range from 50% to approximately 77%.  
Federal contributions to the expansion populations added by the Act begin at 100% (the 
federal government assumes the entire cost) and gradually drop down to 90%.  Even at this 
slightly lower federal payment level, the Medicaid expansions turn out to be a bargain 
according to at least one highly regarded cost estimate, finding state savings of $12 to $19 
billion in 2020 alone, after the federal contribution rate falls.  Matthew Buettgens et al., 
Consider Savings as Well as Costs, THE URBAN INSTITUTE (August 13, 2001), http://www.ur 
ban.org/uploadedpdf/412361-consider-savings.pdf. 
 42. ACA § 2201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3). 
 43. The problem of low-income people who are eligible for public insurance but not 
enrolled is longstanding and is attributed to many factors, one of which is the failure of states 
to simplify the enrollment process and thereby remove artificial barriers to access.  There is 
much literature on Medicaid enrollment barriers.  See, e.g., Amy Davidoff et al., Medicaid-
Eligible Children Who Don’t Enroll: Health Status, Access to Care, and Implications for 
Medicaid Enrollment, 37 INQUIRY 203 (2000); Jennifer Stuber & Elizabeth Bradley, Barriers to 
Medicaid Enrollment: Who is At Risk?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 292 (2005). 
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participation, particularly in the case of specialty care.44  In the case of 
primary care, the existence of the health center programs helps offset the 
lack of access.45  Although free choice of medical providers has been a 
hallmark of Medicaid almost since its 1965 enactment,46 access remains 
seriously constrained.  Whether, in fact, raising Medicaid’s low provider 
payment rates would result in access improvements is a matter of debate in 
view of the fact that access to care is a reflection not just of payment rates 
but also of availability and utilization.47  At the same time, low payment 
rates have generally been regarded as an ipso facto barrier to Medicaid’s 
ability to better assure appropriate care for covered populations. 
II.  ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES CREATED BY MEDICAID’S PRESERVATION 
Assuming that the Affordable Care Act survives constitutional challenges 
mounted against it,48 in the “new normal” that will characterize the 
American health care financing system for nonelderly people circa 2015, 
Medicaid will effectively serve as the platform on which an expanded, 
subsidized individual market will rest.  Workers and their families will 
continue to receive coverage through employer-sponsored health benefit 
plans (the Congressional Budget Office has projected that employment 
based coverage arrangements will remain stable, at least in the near-
term).49  People who qualify for Medicare on the basis of disability will 
 
 44. MACPAC, supra note 1, at 132. 
 45. In 2008 health centers served 17.1 million patients.  See ROSBENBAUM ET AL., 
OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 13 at 2. 
 46. The free choice of provider provision of Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23), was 
not part of the original statute.  H.R. REP. NO. 89-682, at 17 (1965) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 
1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2228, 2246; (“Amendment No. 267: This amendment provided that an 
individual entitled to medical assistance under an approved State plan (under the new title XIX) 
might obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, or person qualified to perform the 
service or services required.  The House bill contained no comparable provision.  The Senate 
recedes.”).  Id.  Instead it was added to the law in 1967 in the wake of evidence of efforts to 
limit Medicaid beneficiaries to government health care facilities, whose survival of course was 
at stake in the wake of what was to be an access enabling reform.  Social Security 
Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 227, 81 Stat. 821, 903-04 (1968).  It is no 
small irony that a half century later, the health care safety net provides the plurality of health 
care access. 
 47. MACPAC, supra note 1, ch. 4. 
 48. See Court Schedules and Documents, HEALTH LAW & LITIGATION, http://www.healthlaw 
andlitigation.com/courts/index.php (last visited Sep. 29, 2011) (providing full inventory of 
pending cases regarding the ACA maintained by the O’Neill Institute in Global Health Law 
and Policy and the National Health Law Program). 
 49. For a complete presentation of all CBO analyses related to the Act, see DOUGLAS W. 
ELMENDORF, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION 
ENACTED IN MARCH 2010 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12119/ 
03-30-HealthCareLegislation.pdf.  CBO’s budget projects are made in ten-year windows.  
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continue to do so.50  Everyone else will secure coverage through one of two 
basic pathways: Medicaid for the poorest people with family incomes below 
its new financial eligibility cutoff point;51 or state health insurance Exchanges 
for low, moderate, and high income individuals without access to employer 
coverage or another form of creditable coverage.52  Coverage subsidies 
thus will flow through Medicaid for the poorest individuals and families, and 
through premium tax credits for qualified individuals. 53 
This all sounds simple enough.  But getting to the new normal entailed 
tackling three major challenges within the scope of the Act.  First, Medicaid 
eligibility rules needed to be changed in order to end the program’s historic 
exclusion of poor adults without disabilities.  Second, Medicaid enrollment 
needed to be simplified given the long history of barriers to entry into, and 
retention of, coverage.  Third, processes needed to be adopted to ensure a 
smooth transition between the two subsidized markets in light of the impact 
of constant income fluctuation on their joint and several operations. 
This third challenge takes on added urgency that goes beyond simply 
the question of assuring appropriate connection to the correct source of 
financial subsidy; that is, this is more than an accounting problem.  Modern 
health insurance products are characterized by coverage that in turn is tied 
to provider networks.54  As a result, one’s source of coverage effectively 
becomes one’s source of health care for all but emergency medical 
 
What happens to people after that is anyone’s guess, although CBO anticipates very small 
changes in employer behavior as a result of the Act.  See PAUL D. JACOBS, CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S EFFECTS ON EMPLOYERS’ 
DECISIONS TO OFFER HEALTH INSURANCE (July 13, 2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftp 
docs/123xx/doc12374/07-13-2011-Jacobs_IHEA-presentation_CBO-analysis-employer-re 
sponses.pdf.  It is also anyone’s guess as to whether the establishment of state health 
insurance Exchanges and federally subsidized coverage will in fact trigger entirely different 
behavior on the part of all but, perhaps, the very largest or wealthiest of employers.  But this is 
another law review article. 
 50. ACA § 3601 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395). 
 51. Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes in 
Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30 
HEALTH AFF. 228, 228 (2011) [hereinafter Issues in Health Reform] (citing ACA § 1401(a) (to 
be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36)). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Medicaid is referred to explicitly as a state health subsidy program under the law.  
ACA § 1413(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18083). 
 54. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & ED. TRUST, NO. 8085, EMPLOYER 
HEALTH BENEFITS: 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY ex. 4.3 (2010), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/ 
2010/8085.pdf.  As of 2010, only 3% of firms offered “conventional” insurance, that is, 
insurance in which coverage is fully available up to plan limits regardless of the provider from 
whom care is obtained.  See id. 
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conditions.55  Unstable coverage thus raises the specter of disruption in 
health care itself, a significant consequence in view of the important role 
that continuity in care plays in assuring access, health care quality, and 
administrative efficiency, another basic aim of the Act.56 
The Affordable Care Act addressed the first two issues,57 while leaving 
the third essentially untouched.  Although it falls largely to states to address 
the problem, we argue below that there are steps the federal government 
might take, as part of implementation, to ease matters. 
A. Coverage of the Poorest Americans 
The hallmark of pre-ACA Medicaid eligibility was its discrimination 
against poor adults who were neither pregnant, disabled nor parents of 
minor children.  Conceived as an outgrowth of the cash welfare programs 
to which it was connected,58 Medicaid historically was limited in its scope of 
eligibility to those categories of persons who qualified for welfare assistance: 
parents of minor children whose incomes and resources placed them below 
their state’s welfare eligibility standards under Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (“AFDC”);59 and recipients of aid to the aged, blind 
and disabled, recodified in 1972 as Supplemental Security Income.60  Over 
nearly fifty years, Congress added numerous mandatory and optional 
eligibility categories, extending coverage to millions of additional poor 
people, chief among them, all pregnant women, infants and children up to 
age six with family incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level, and all 
 
 55. The Act extends coverage for emergency medical care on an out-of-network basis to 
all insured persons.  ACA § 10101(h) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19A) (adding 
PHSA § 2719A). 
 56. Shana Alex Lavarreda et al., Switching Health Insurance and its Effects on Access to 
Physician Services, 46 MED. CARE 1055, 1060 (2008); Sharon K. Long, Teresa Coughlin & 
Jennifer King, How Well Does Medicaid Work in Improving Access to Care?, 40 HEALTH 
SERVICES RES. 39, 54-55 (2005); Issues in Health Reform, supra, note 51 at 229; Joel S. 
Weissman et al., Delayed Access to Health Care: Risk Factors, Reasons and Consequences, 
114 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 325, 329 (1991). 
 57. ACA § 2001 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)) (providing Medicaid coverage 
for the lowest income populations); ACA § 2202 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(w)(3)) 
(simplifying Medicaid enrollment and coordination with State Health Insurance Exchanges). 
 58. ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF 
MEDICAID chs. 1, 4 (Transaction Publishers 2003) (1974).  For a history of the evolution of 
Medicaid eligibility categories see MACPAC, supra note 1, at 27-45. 
 59. The AFDC program was repealed in 1966 and replaced with the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families Program (“TANF”).  Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.  Medicaid 
eligibility on a mandatory basis remains tied to states’ historic 1996 AFDC eligibility 
standards.  Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (2006). 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i). 
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children ages 6-18 with family incomes up to 100% of the federal poverty 
level.61 
As important as they were, these expansions failed to address two 
separate issues, the first being the lack of a recognized eligibility “category” 
for nonelderly adults who were neither caretakers of dependent children nor 
disabled, and the second being the program’s link in the case of adults with 
children to states’ historic AFDC eligibility standards which as of 2009 were 
as low as 20% of the federal poverty level.62  Under federally sanctioned 
arrangements authorized by the Social Security Act’s special demonstration 
authority63 a handful of states covered additional low-income adults.64  As 
of 2009 however, no federal law either required or allowed such coverage 
as a matter of state Medicaid plan administration. 
The Affordable Care Act restructured Medicaid eligibility, breaking its 
last link to its old welfare eligibility categories.  The Act added a new 
mandatory categorical eligibility group to Medicaid consisting of nonelderly 
adults with family incomes below 133% of the federal poverty level65 and 
who otherwise would be ineligible for coverage based on pregnancy, 
disability, or as the caretaker of a dependent child.66  The medical 
assistance entitlement for this newly eligible population consists of  
“benchmark benefits,” which were modified by the Act to parallel the 
essential benefit requirements of the Act.67  The Act further creates a state 
option, beginning January 1, 2014, to extend Medicaid coverage to adults 
with higher incomes that exceed 133% of the federal poverty level.68  In the 
case of adults made eligible for Medicaid on a mandatory basis, the federal 
medical assistance percentage (that is, the federal contribution toward state 
 
 61. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(IV), (VI). 
 62. See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid and National Health Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2009, 2009-10 (2009). 
 63. Social Security Act § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006). 
 64. KAISER FAMILY COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 7874, THE ROLE OF 
SECTION 1115 WAIVERS IN MEDICAID AND CHIP, LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD 1, 6-7 
(2009) [hereinafter SECTION 1115 WAIVERS], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/ 
7874.pdf. 
 65. ACA § 2001(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a).  In reality the income eligibility 
standard is 138% of the federal poverty level because of an additional 5% income disregard 
added to the eligibility calculation methodology under HCERA. ACA § 1004(e) (amending 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14)). 
 66. ACA § 2001(a) (amending Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a). 
 67. ACA § 2001(c) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b). 
 68. ACA § 2001(e)(1)(A)(iii) (amending Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
140 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:127 
expenditures) was increased to 100% for calendar years 2014-2016, 
dropping to 90% by 2020 and years thereafter.69 
In addition, the Act further eliminated states’ use of a Medicaid asset test 
and revised the methodology used to evaluate income to conform with that 
used when determining eligibility for premium tax credits and cost sharing 
assistance in the case of Exchange qualified individuals,70 thereby 
harmonizing the income calculation methodology between the two basic 
subsidy systems. 
B. Enrollment in Medicaid 
Enrollment in Medicaid traditionally has been a horror.  In part to 
conform to the law’s intricate eligibility requirements (including verification 
procedures required by law) and in part in order to keep people off the rolls 
for budgetary reasons, states typically utilized Byzantine enrollment 
procedures that were seemingly designed to be as difficult as possible.  
Applications could run thirty pages; were available only by physically going 
to a welfare office and picking the application up; welfare offices were open 
for application pickup only at odd hours; applications were written only in 
English; the English that was used would defeat comprehension by most law 
students, not to mention lawyers; masses of unnecessary and irrelevant 
information were required as part of the application; applications would be 
accepted only on certain days; only completed applications would be 
accepted; incomplete applications would be mailed back at some future 
date with an explanation that they could not be processed; an in-person 
interview would be required; in-person interviews could happen only on 
certain days, typically in the middle of work; and on and on.71  And then the 
process would begin anew at the point of eligibility redetermination, 
conducted at least once annually and as frequently under federal law as 
monthly, at a state’s option.72 
Over the years a tremendous amount of determined advocacy shone a 
light on this problem, and Congress, along with a number of enlightened 
states, began to respond in recognition of Medicaid as a health care 
 
 69. ACA § 2001(a)(3) (amending Social Security Act § 1905, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d). 
 70. ACA § 2002 (amending Social Security Act § 1902(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)). 
 71. See Davidoff, supra note 43; Stuber, supra note 43 for studies of Medicaid 
enrollment barriers.  Professor Rosenbaum finds it instructive to recite the adventure of 
Medicaid applications from memory. 
 72. 42 C.F.R. § 435.916 (2009).  In addition to this periodic redetermination process, 
individuals must report any interim change in circumstances that might affect their eligibility, 
which can also result in the loss of coverage.  Id. 
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program rather than as a welfare benefit to be “churned.”73  Steps taken 
have included many changes to reduce barriers to both initial enrollment 
and retention of coverage.  These steps included shortened and far more 
accessible applications, elimination of eligibility criteria and verification 
procedures not required under federal law, online enrollment and out 
stationed enrollment assistance, longer enrollment periods before eligibility 
needed to be redetermined, “passive” redeterminations that allow 
individuals to retain coverage in the absence of any change in 
circumstances, the elimination of in-person interviews, and more.  Most of 
these changes took place in the context of pregnant women and children.74  
The Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 went 
so far as to create financial bonuses for states that simplified enrollment and 
retention of coverage.75 
The Affordable Care Act took matters further.  The ACA essentially 
eliminates state flexibility to make enrollment difficult, either for persons 
made newly eligible by the Act or for those falling into traditional Medicaid 
eligibility categories.  The ACA requires that as a condition of federal 
financial participation, states assure enrollment simplification and 
coordination with state health insurance Exchanges.76  Enrollment 
simplification must include initial enrollment and renewal activities, online 
application and electronic signature, the use of a secure electronic interface 
between state Medicaid agencies and state Exchanges to assure full 
screening without repeat visits under all potential subsidy sources, outreach 
to find underserved populations not enrolled, and other steps.77  Most 
significantly perhaps, individuals can enroll in Medicaid through their state 
health insurance Exchanges, which have a parallel duty to screen individuals 
for eligibility for premium tax credits or any other state subsidy (including 
Medicaid) and to enroll individuals if they are determined to be eligible.78 
 
 73. Welfare churning is a classic term of art used by legal services attorneys and scholars 
alike.  It denotes knocking people off the program for no really good reason.  See generally 
David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231 (1998). 
 74. See, e.g., DONNA COHEN ROSS, ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE 
UNINSURED, NO. 7608, RESUMING THE PATH TO HEALTH COVERAGE FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS: 
A 50 STATE UPDATE ON ELIGIBILITY RULES, ENROLLMENT AND RENEWAL PROCEDURES, AND COST-
SHARING PRACTICES IN MEDICAID AND SCHIP IN 2006, at 1, 5, 15 (2007), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7608.pdf. 
 75. Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
3, § 104, 123 Stat. 17, 17-23. 
 76. ACA § 2201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3) (adding Social Security Act § 
1943). 
 77. Id. 
 78. ACA § 1311(d)(4)(F) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031). 
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C. Transitioning Between Medicaid and the Exchange 
This brings us to the third issue, the problem of market transitions 
created by the fact that the subsidy system comprised of Medicaid and 
premium tax credits available through state health insurance Exchanges are 
income sensitive.  Each has a hard stop.  Medicaid eligibility terminates at 
138% of the federal poverty level, and the Exchanges pick up at this point.79  
When family income drops back below this threshold, Medicaid eligibility 
resumes; furthermore, under the express terms of the ACA, any coverage 
month for which an individual is eligible for Medicaid is a coverage month 
for which the individual is not eligible for premium assistance.80 
The mechanics of implementing this system (i.e., catching up with 
people whose incomes fluctuate from month-to-month and transitioning 
them between subsidy sources) are daunting.  To make matters more 
complex, the Exchange subsidies (i.e., tax credits) and Medicaid coverage 
are under the control of two very different types of governmental entities—
the IRS on one side with state Medicaid agencies and HHS on the other.81  
Each of the parties in this uneasy relationship has every interest in strict 
enforcement against the other (HHS aligned with state Medicaid agencies 
against the IRS) in order to assure cost avoidance against the agency’s 
financial obligations.  All three agencies will have to put into place a 
previously untested type of information sharing arrangement. 
Worse still is the fact that this problem of market transition is not a small 
one.  Where the poor are concerned, the great advance of the ACA is its 
elimination of the Medicaid cliff.  In the pre-ACA days (meaning now, of 
course, since the Exchange reforms do not begin until January 1, 2014), 
people who lost Medicaid lost their insurance entirely.82  There were many 
reasons why this happened, income fluctuation being one of them, failure to 
comply with program requirements or make it through the redetermination 
maze being another, and the effects on coverage and access were severe.  
One study showed that by the end of twenty-three months, 55% of adults 
initially enrolled in Medicaid were disenrolled, and half of those who lost 
coverage remained uninsured six months later.83  Another study examining 
insurance over a four-year time period found that over this time span, 41% 
 
 79. ACA § 1004(e) (to be codified at 42. U.S.C. § 1396a). 
 80. ACA § 1401 (amending I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)). 
 81. HHS, IRS Issue Proposed Rules on Health Exchange Enrollment, Subsidies, Credits, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF PUB. HOSP. & HEALTH SYS. (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.naph.org/Homepage-
Sections/News/Latest-From-Newsline/HHS-IRS-Issue-Proposed-Rules-on-Health-Exchange-En 
rollment-Subsidies-Credits.aspx. 
 82. See Benjamin D. Sommers, Loss of Health Insurance Among Non-elderly Adults in 
Medicaid, 24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1, 4 (2009). 
 83. Id. at 4. 
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of adults experienced repeated cycles of Medicaid coverage interspersed 
with being uninsured.84 
The ACA’s seminal contribution in this regard is the creation of a 
continuous source of coverage for people who lose Medicaid.  In this sense, 
the old churning problem—that is, being churned on and off the program 
and left without coverage—is structurally eliminated.  Nonetheless, a new 
problem, which might be called transitional churning, arises in its stead.  
How this transition across the two markets occurs becomes central to the 
success of the program for lower income families, not only because of the 
potential for disruption in financial subsidies, but because the disruptions 
will affect both coverage and care. 
In order to examine the magnitude of this challenge more closely, we 
analyzed data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, a 
nationally representative longitudinal survey carried out by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.85  The study collects detailed information from participants every 
four months over four twelve-month waves, thereby providing an 
incomparable look at changes in income and participation in programs 
such as Medicaid.  Our study period spanned the 2004-2008 time period 
and focused on adults.  We sought to measure the extent of income 
fluctuations within the population at the edge of the transitional churn—that 
is, people with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty level.  What we 
found is presented in Figures 1-2 reproduced from our earlier study: 
   
 
 84. Pam Farley Short & Deborah R. Graefe, Battery Powered Health Insurance? Stability in 
Coverage of the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 244, 251. 
 85. The full methodology for our analysis can be found in Issues in Health Reform, supra 
note 51. 
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Income Changes Over Time Among Adults Ages 19–60 With Incomes Initially Under 133 

















Income Changes Over Time Among Adults Ages 19-60 With Incomes Initially Between 133 
















 86. Copyrighted and published by Project HOPE/Health Affairs as Benjamin D. Sommers 
and Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes In Eligibility May Move Millions 
Back and Forth Between Medicaid And Insurance Exchanges, Health Aff (Millwood).  2011; 
30(2):231.  The published article is archived and available online at www.healthaffairs.org. 
 87. Copyrighted and published by Project HOPE/Health Affairs as Benjamin D. Sommers 
and Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes In Eligibility May Move Millions 
Back and Forth Between Medicaid And Insurance Exchanges, Health Aff (Millwood).  2011; 
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What the figures show is that as time passes, fluctuations in income 
translate into a high level of movement across the Medicaid-Exchange 
market divide, among both those originally eligible for Medicaid (Figure 1) 
and those originally eligible for Exchange subsidies (Figure 2). The 
cumulative effects of income fluctuations on market movement over time are 
shown in Figure 3.  A full 50% of adults with incomes initially under 200% of 
the federal poverty level would have experienced at least one movement 
across the divide within a year, while 24% would have experienced at least 
two eligibility changes within a year.  By the end of forty-eight months, over 
38% of adults ages 19-60 falling within the income range we tested would 





















Further analysis of the transitional churners, who totaled an estimated 
28 million just in the first year of churning, shows that they are more likely to 
be younger, white, married, male, with a high school education or greater.89  
In other words, they are exactly the young workers with spouses and families 
 
 88. Copyrighted and published by Project HOPE/Health Affairs as Benjamin D. Sommers 
and Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes In Eligibility May Move Millions 
Back and Forth Between Medicaid And Insurance Exchanges, Health Aff (Millwood).  2011; 
30(2):232.  The published article is archived and available online at www.healthaffairs.org. 
 89. Id. at 230, 233 ex. 4. 
88 
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(the number of churned adults translates into an estimated 17-18 million 
children affected)90 whose participation in coverage is so critical to the 
success of the ACA.  Indeed, this population at risk for what might be 
thought of as enrollment fatigue, is exactly the group (along with older 
workers forced out of the job market by illness or unemployment) whose 
image comes to mind when one thinks about the achievements of the Act. 
III.  ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF TRANSITIONAL CHURNING IN THE NEW NORMAL 
The ACA essentially leaves this issue of transitional churning 
unaddressed and a major challenge for the implementation process.  The 
law might have offered one basic tool that would have mitigated (but by no 
means fixed) the problem, namely, a subsidy structure utilizing annual 
enrollment periods.  Under this model, people’s subsidy eligibility (tax 
premiums or Medicaid) would have been determined for a plan year, 
allowing the equivalent of the open enrollment process used in the 
workplace.  Individuals would sign up for coverage, say, on November 1, 
their incomes as of November 1 would have been compared to the subsidy 
scale as of that date, and the subsidy would have been locked in for the 
next twelve months.  In the short run, this would have, at least on paper, 
cost one subsidy source or another extra money, since the payer for the year 
potentially would be paying for months in which the individual or family 
technically did not qualify for coverage.  But income fluctuation being what 
it is, the additional cost would have washed out in following years, when the 
subsidy’s recipient’s income shifted to the other source of funding.  Using an 
annual enrollment process and a twelve-month projected income approach, 
the law could have offered far more stability in enrollment. 
Unfortunately, the federal policymaking process is about nothing if not 
“on paper” cost projections and short term cost avoidance.  Because a 
stabilization strategy to enrollment would have cost the federal government 
additional money in the short term in the form of “excess” advance premium 
tax credits, the proposal was not considered beyond the initial cost 
estimation phase.91  Of course a state might take matters into its own hands 
and, utilizing state funding, provide the additional resources needed to 
stabilize enrollment on an annual basis.  The administrative efficiencies to 
be gained from such a model, as well as the incentives that it conceivably 
creates for strong take-up among healthy young workers and their families 
who are drawn to its simplicity and parallelism with the workplace 
 
 90. Id. at 232.  The total sample in Sommers and Rosenbaum corresponds to 56 million 
adults with 35 million children.  Id.  If roughly half of parents churn in a single year, this 
translates into 17.5 million children potentially affected.  Id. 
 91. In the interest of disclosure, Professor Rosenbaum was involved in the development of 
the proposal. 
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enrollment process, are considerable.  Yet with state economies being what 
they are, in the absence of a federal partnership, such an outcome is highly 
unlikely. 
One possibility for moving toward this model is the federal State 
Innovation Waiver or Basic Health Program options.92  Both pathways (the 
former for all populations, the latter for the low income population) permit 
states to replace the existing structure envisioned in federal law with one of 
their own making.  States opting for this approach would receive federal 
payments in relation to the size of their subsidy-eligible populations, along 
with special waivers under Medicaid, to fashion alternative models of 
coverage.93  In such a structure, testing an annual enrollment period might 
be feasible, although again, the problem would arise as to how to offset the 
initial short-term costs in order to achieve longer-term gains.  Here the 
federal Office of Management and Budget, whose job it would be to certify 
the budgetary soundness of state models against otherwise-anticipated 
federal outlays, might play a key role by utilizing a longer timeframe for 
determining budget neutrality, thereby allowing short term investments to be 
realized through back-end savings.94 
Even with the establishment of annual enrollment periods however, the 
problem is only partially resolved, since the potential for disruption in care is 
possible if the Medicaid and Exchange markets utilize two different groups 
of insurance plans.  Traditionally, the Medicaid managed care market (70% 
of all beneficiaries are enrolled in managed care arrangements, and this 
proportion is expected to grow)95 has been relatively specialized, consisting 
either of companies that sell only in this market or of Medicaid subsidiaries 
of larger health benefit services corporations that sell in multiple markets.96  
This specialty has developed for good reason: the Medicaid benefit package 
is unique in relation to commercial products, as this article suggests.  
Medicaid beneficiaries tend to be concentrated in medically underserved 
communities where special networks heavily emphasizing safety net 
providers must be utilized; and Medicaid beneficiaries may be more likely to 
present social and clinical challenges requiring providers such as health 
centers and safety-net hospital clinics whose staff providers have relevant 
experience, particularly in furnishing primary care in a broader social 
 
 92. ACA §§ 1331, 1332 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18051, 18052). 
 93. ACA §§ 1331, 1332. 
 94. There is precedent for such a long term approach to cost estimation in state 
experiments, since the OMB has used longer term windows in the past in approving Medicaid 
section 1115 demonstrations, which must be budget neutral.  See SECTION 1115 WAIVERS, 
supra note 64, at 4. 
 95. MACPAC, supra note 1, at 42. 
 96. See MACPAC, supra note 1, at 48. 
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welfare context.  Medicaid providers often are entry points not only in 
relation to clinical treatment for immediately presenting preventive needs or 
acute conditions, but also for nutritional assistance and patient support 
services.  In the best models, the health care safety net is a point of contact 
for a full range of social interventions including education, child care, 
housing supports, and jobs programs. 
While persons with fluctuating incomes related to work do not face 
impoverishment as deep as that which confronts millions of Medicaid 
beneficiaries, the experience of a deeply distressed economy highlights just 
how many families are barely making it and are only a step away from 
economic and personal catastrophe.  For this reason, families would be 
advantaged were states to develop a market of health plans that are 
certified to participate in both Medicaid and health insurance Exchanges 
and whose provider networks remain completely in place, regardless of 
which subsidy source happens to be paying the enrollment fee for any given 
month.  Because Exchange premiums are risk-adjusted,97 the potential for 
this market to attract both higher-cost cases as well as younger families with 
variable incomes would be mitigated by the risk-adjusted payments to offset 
the cost of more clinically challenging members. 
From families’ perspectives, the ability to remain with one’s pediatrician, 
internist, obstetrician, or nurse practitioner and not have to change 
clinicians every year is of major importance.  The importance of continuity 
and stability grows even more so in families with children or adults who have 
serious health care needs.  Families’ interests in stable care, even when 
health care choices open up, at least in theory, is reflected in a study of 
patient use of safety net providers after universal health reform in 
Massachusetts.  That study found that safety net providers retained and even 
grew their patient populations in the wake of Massachusetts’ health reform 
implementation.98 
In the absence of continuous enrollment subsidies that permit stable 
enrollment in a single plan over time, the unification of the health plan 
market should be an even greater focus on the part of HHS and states.  The 
ACA specifies cooperation between Exchanges and Medicaid programs on 
matters of enrollment.99  It does not do so on matters of market alignment, 
leaving this issue instead to the federal and state governments to identify 
and resolve on their own.  The importance of this challenge is such that it 
represents a major issue on which the federal government should take a 
lead through creation of tools that foster market harmonization.  Extensive 
 
 97. ACA § 1312 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032). 
 98. Leighton Ku et al., Safety-Net Providers After Health Care Reform: Lessons From 
Massachusetts, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1379, 1379-83 (2011). 
 99. ACA § 1943 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3). 
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federal regulations govern the Medicaid managed care market.100  An HHS-
led initiative to align these requirements with federal requirements 
applicable to qualified health plans operating in state health insurance 
Exchanges would be enormously productive, as would a federal process of 
joint certification in both markets.  While as is inevitable in laws, the 
operational requirements for Medicaid managed care and qualified health 
plans are somewhat differently expressed in statute, both the federal 
Medicaid statute and the ACA leave plenty of room for HHS to adopt plan 
certification standards governing both programs.  Plans with dual 
certification could then be marketed as such to families so that the benefits 
of stability over time (regardless of changes in family income) would be 
clear.  At the very minimum, federal standards are essential to guide the 
process of transitioning families between markets, particularly in the case of 
patients with significant health needs, whose source of care must change 
because of a change in the source of subsidy enrollment. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For reasons both expedient and compelling, the Affordable Care Act 
maintains Medicaid as an independent source of health insurance 
coverage, extending its reach to nearly all non-elderly poor people and 
using it as a platform to build a companion state-based coverage 
arrangement that essentially picks up where Medicaid leaves off. This 
approach preserves all that is vital about Medicaid while assuring that the 
end of Medicaid eligibility does not equate with the loss of access to 
subsidized coverage.  Many improvements to Medicaid identified over 
decades—simplified categorical eligibility, a simplified set of methods for 
determining financial eligibility, and vastly simplified enrollment and 
retention—are signature features of the ACA. 
At the same time, however, by employing a layered approach to 
subsidized coverage without paying real attention to the consequences of 
layering, the Affordable Care Act has the potential to push millions of 
younger, healthier adults and their families between two subsidy worlds in a 
constant churning motion.  Given the daily pressures that face lower income 
working families and their relative good health, the very younger workers 
and their families whose aid is such a central feature of the ACA may 
experience multiple breaks in coverage.  Ultimately they simply may walk 
away from coverage entirely, victims of what might be thought of as 
enrollment fatigue.  To be sure, periods of coverage lapses may be shorter 
given the constant availability of an alternative subsidy system.  But if 
families exposed to churning get tired of the whole thing and effectively 
 
 100. See 42 C.F.R. § 438 (2010). 
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wander off, the very people whose participation is most important to the risk 
solidarity aspect of health reform may be lost to the system.  Ironically, many 
of these people may never experience a tax penalty for walking away, since 
their annual family incomes may place them below the taxpayer penalty 
threshold.  The real loss is the chance for stable coverage, which ultimately 
may affect their health and well-being, as well as the chances for a more 
stable and efficient health care system along the way will erode. 
The simplest way to mitigate at least some of the risk would have been 
annual enrollment periods.  This reform probably is a non-starter for now, in 
the absence of convincing economic analyses showing that the cost of 
stable enrollment would be offset by its economic benefits.  Designing and 
carrying out such a study is difficult; convincing the Congressional Budget 
Office that such measurable cost savings really do exist, if found, is even 
more so in our experience, because of CBO’s natural skepticism regarding 
the value of health care investments.101  Without CBO-scored cost savings 
on one’s side, reforms to make the health care system work better are 
unlikely.  States could of course create subsidies of their own, but this is also 
unlikely in today’s economic climate. 
The more realistic solution may be unification of the seller market of 
Medicaid managed care plans and Exchange qualified health plans.  In this 
way, the same products could be offered in both markets, using common 
networks, common terms of coverage  (additional Medicaid benefits could 
offered as a supplement for those whose financial circumstances place them 
on the Medicaid side of the subsidy line), and at least compatible payment 
systems.  Common performance measures could also be utilized for a 
standard market basket of preventive, acute care, and ongoing health 
management activities, such as management of diabetes or cardiovascular 
disease.  Indeed, the emphasis in the ACA on national quality of care 
standards across all health plans moves performance measurement in this 
direction already.102 
Of course, Medicaid also will continue to serve a core group of 
beneficiaries who are deeply impoverished and whose disabilities put them 
outside a sufficiently significant enough level of work to trigger constant 
income swings.  For this population, Medicaid will remain the primary 
health insurer and will out of necessity play a role that has no real 
counterpart in the Exchange system.  Because health care for people who 
face the greatest burdens of illness is perhaps Medicaid’s highest aim, the 
program’s continuation in this capacity was crucial to the shaping of the 
Affordable Care Act.  At the same time, however, Medicaid needs to be 
 
 101. For a superb article underscoring this paradox, see Tim Westmoreland, Standard 
Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 1555 (2007). 
 102. ACA § 3012 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280j). 
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able to grow into a financing system that can serve as a fully integrated 
companion to the new market created through state health insurance 
Exchanges.  Indeed, if Medicaid does not achieve this result, the full 
participation by individuals and families whose coverage is central to the 
ACA’s ultimate goals of affordable care for everyone may be jeopardized. 
Using the tools of Basic Health Program and State Innovation Waivers, 
as well as the technique of market harmonization to promote compatibility 
of product design and regulatory oversight, the federal and state 
governments, working in close companionship, should be able to alleviate 
the impact of bifurcation.  Future research efforts should be structured to 
focus on this process of alignment, developing alignment benchmarks and 
measurable outcomes, so that future Congresses in a potentially stronger 
position to attend to this set of challenges will have the benefit of a strong 
empirical basis on which to act. 
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